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Abstract 
This article provides empirical support for the hypothesis that different 
exchange rate regimes have an impact on inflation in advanced, emerging 
and developing countries. The effects of different exchange rate regimes on 
inflation performance are examined through least squares dummy variables 
regressions using panel data on 125 countries for the post-Bretton Woods 
(1974-1999). Also, this article addresses the issue of measurement errors in 
the classification of exchange rate regimes by using four different 
classification schemes. Three de facto and one de jure classifications are 
used. Consequently, the sensitivity of these results to alternative exchange 
rate classifications is also tested. The empirical findings indicate that 
countries with fixed regimes tend to have a lower inflation rate compared to 
floating and intermediate exchange rate regimes, particularly in emerging 
and developing countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, adopting a correct exchange rate 
regime that contributes to low inflation and encourages economic growth, has been a great 
challenge. A wide variety of exchange rate regimes, ranging from completely flexible to 
completely fixed (with a wide range of intermediate systems) have been adopted by different 
countries. The debate over fixed, intermediate and floating exchange arrangements has once 
again taken centre stage in academic circles. Some economists maintain that the first round of 
this debate was won by those advocating floating arrangements because all crisis episodes 
took place in countries which had adopted a variety of mechanisms for pegging their exchange 
regimes. Conversely, the advocates of fixed exchange regimes suggest that there are bad 
fixes and good fixes (like official dollarization) and good or truly fixed arrangements that allow 
countries to achieve credibility and lower inflation.  
An important recent development in the debate over optimal exchange rate regimes is the 
recognition that the choice of an exchange rate arrangement is different between particular 
groups of countries. The choice of an exchange rate regime for developed countries is 
different from that of developing countries or emerging economy countries. Developing 
countries are often beset by a lack of credibility and limited access to international capital 
markets. Hence fixed exchange rate regimes play a useful role by providing policymakers with 
a nominal anchor for monetary policy and by helping to establish a degree of policy credibility. 
In contrast, emerging market economies are more integrated with global financial markets but 
they have encountered more currency crises under pegged exchange rate arrangements 
(Husain et al., 2005). Developed countries have obtained more benefits from flexible exchange 
regimes because they are more developed economically and institutionally, and more 
integrated in global financial markets (Rogoff et al., 2003). 
Contrary to a large number of theoretical studies in the literature, relatively few studies 
attempt to empirically investigate the impact of an exchange rate regime on inflation 
performance in developed, emerging and developing countries, separately. This is perhaps, 
because such an empirical investigation is fraught with difficulties, including the problem 
concerning the classification of exchange arrangement. This article addresses the issue of 
measurement errors in the classification of exchange rate regimes by using four different 
classification schemes. Three de facto and one de jure classifications are used. Consequently, 
the sensitivity of these results to alternative exchange rate classifications is also tested. The 
principal conclusion emerging from this study is the following: fixed exchange rate 
arrangements deliver lower inflation particularly in emerging and developing countries. This 
result supports those views arguing that the credibility associated with fixed regimes helps 
policy-makers achieve lower inflation outcomes.  
The remainder of this article is organised in the following way: Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review focusing on exchange arrangement classifications and on the link between 
exchange rate regimes and inflation. Section 3 describes the empirical framework. A 
preliminary analysis of the data is presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports empirical findings. 
Section 6 concludes the findings of this article. 
 
 
 
3 of 16 
2 Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation: A Survey of the 
Literature 
This literature review section is broken down into two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
constitutes a brief discussion on the different approaches, considered in this study; to 
exchange rate regime classification is presented. The second sub-section presents a review of 
empirical analyses of exchange arrangements and speculative attacks.  
 
2.1 Regime Classification 
A common problem in the empirical analysis of exchange rate systems is regime 
classification. The literature identifies two approaches to this problem: the de jure classification 
and the de facto classification. The first classifies countries by what they say they do (de jure). 
However, countries often act differently to what they declare they do. In particular, a self-
declared independent floating regime, in reality, often operates a managed peg regime. This 
phenomenon of operating a disguised peg is referred to as "fear of floating" (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002). Classifying countries by what they actually do is a de facto classification. 
Some authors develop de facto classifications using various methods (Ghosh et al., 1997; 
Bailliu et al., 2001; Moreno, 2001; Poirson, 2002; Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004; Garofalo, 2005; Dubas et al., 2005; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenergger, 2005; Bérnassy-Quéré et al., 2006; Frankel and Wei, 2008; Klein and 
Shambaugh, 2008; Ilzetski et al., 2010), but these are fundamentally based on data on the 
behaviour of nominal exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates2. 
Some empirical studies simply employ the de facto classification because the de jure 
classification may reach incorrect results3, particularly about floating regimes. On the other 
hand, some research employs the de jure classification arguing that it suffers from less 
drawbacks than the de facto classification4. 
In this article we employ a combination of three de facto and one de jure classifications. 
Firstly, we use the de facto classification developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005), 
henceforth known as the "LYS classification". These authors apply a cluster analysis to a data 
set with three variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, 
and the volatility of international reserves from all IMF reporting countries in the period 1974-
2000. Secondly, the "natural classification" developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is 
employed. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) reclassified exchange rate regimes based on market 
determined dual and parallel exchange rates, and use official rates only if the exchange rates 
are unified5. These authors examine the chronologies of the exchange rate history for 153 
countries in the period 1946-2001. They are able to distinguish among floating by high inflation 
countries (freely falling) from floating by others. They define the category of "freely falling" 
rates when the 12-month rate of inflation exceeds 40% and when, during these periods of high 
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short of capturing policies inconsistent with the commitment, which lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the 
parity. 
5
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inflation there is no official announcement of the regime by the authorities6. In addition, they 
define hyperfloats as those episodes of macroeconomic instability that are characterised by 
hyperinflation where the monthly inflation rate is 50% or more. Thirdly, an alternative 
classification scheme developed by Bailliu et al. (2001) is used. These authors develop a 
Hybrid Mechanical Rule (HMR) classification. This system classifies exchange rate regimes in 
terms of their observed flexibility and takes into account external shocks and revaluations. 
Their analysis is based on a sample of 60 countries for the period 1973-1998. Finally, the de 
jure classification from the IMF is used7. 
In our analysis all the different classifications are grouped into three broader regimes: 
fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes (see Table 1). Managed floating is 
classified under the floating category because managed, in the context of the Reinhart-Rogoff 
classification, does not necessarily imply active or frequent foreign exchange market 
intervention.  
 
Table 1: Classification of Exchange Rate Regime 
Fixed Intermediate Floating 
De facto Classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenerger 
(1) Fixed (2) Crawling peg 
(3) Dirty floats 
(4) Float 
De facto Classification by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(1) No separate legal tender 
(2) Pre-announced peg or 
currency board arrangement 
(3) Pre-announced horizontal 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2% 
(4) De facto peg 
(5) Pre-announced crawling peg 
(6) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2% 
(7) De facto crawling peg 
(8) De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to ± 
2% 
(9) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is wide than or equal 
± 2% 
(10) De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to ± 
5% 
(11) Moving band that is 
narrower than or equal to ± 2%   
(12) Managed floating 
(13) Freely floating 
(14) Freely falling 
(15) Hyperfloating 
De facto Classification by Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(1) Currency boards 
(2) Single currency peg 
(3) Basket pegs 
(4) Crawling pegs with narrow 
bands 
(5) Flexibility index ≤ 1 
 
(6) Flexibility index ≥ 1 
 
De jure Classification by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(1) Pegged regimes (2) Intermediate regimes (4) Floating regimes 
      Note: Inconclusive classifications from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger are not considered in our analysis.  
Sources: Bailliu et al. (2001); Bailliu et al. (2003); Ghosh et al. (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenergger (2005). 
 
                                               
6
 In situations where the currency crisis marks a sudden transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed 
or independently floating regime, they label an exchange rate as freely falling during the six months immediately 
following a currency crisis. 
7
 The data on the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from Ghosh et al. (2002) and from the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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2.2 Exchange Rate Arrangements and Inflation 
Theoretical and empirical literature on exchange rate arrangements and inflation suggests 
that countries using fixed exchange rate regimes and consistent macro policies tend to have 
lower and more stable rates of inflation. The explanation for this is simply that a fixed 
exchange rate provides a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy8 and for the evolution of 
the price level. Fixed rates also provide a visible commitment, thereby raising the political 
costs of excessive monetary growth. A credible peg is likely to engender a more robust 
demand for money, which reduces the inflationary consequences of a given monetary 
expansion. In this order, the empirical work of Ghosh et al. (1997) shows that inflation under 
fixed exchange rate regimes is significantly lower than under intermediate or freely floating 
arrangements. Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2002) find a positive association between the degree of 
nominal exchange rate regime flexibility and inflation even after controlling the effects of 
money growth. 
On the other hand, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) investigate the impact of 
exchange rate regimes on inflation, nominal money growth, real interest rates, and GDP 
growth. These authors show that, for non-industrial economies, “long” (lasting five or more 
years) pegs are associated with lower inflation than floats, but at the cost of slower growth. 
Additionally, Moreno (2001), using his own de facto classification, examine how pegging is 
associated with inflation and output in a sample of 98 developing and emerging market 
economies for the period 1974-1998. His result shows that a pegged exchange rate is 
associated with lower inflation. While, Domac et al. (2001), using de jure classification from 
IMF, examine whether the exchange rate regime has any impact on inflation and growth 
performance in 22 transition economies for the period 1991-1998. The findings indicate that 
transition countries with intermediate arrangements may achieve lower inflation if they were to 
adopt a fixed regime. The results also suggest that switching from a floating regime to an 
intermediate arrangement may not deliver lower inflation. Similar results were found by Domac 
et al. (2003). Theses authors investigate empirically the link between the exchange rate 
regime and inflation performance in transition economies. Their result suggests that fixed 
exchange rate regimes tend to deliver lower and more stable rates of inflation. 
Rogoff et al. (2003) re-examine the link between exchange rate regimes and economic 
performance across four dimensions: inflation, output growth, growth volatility, and the 
incidence of crises. Their results suggest that, for countries at a relatively early stage of 
financial development and integration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes appear to offer some 
anti-inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives. On the contrary, for 
developed countries that are not in a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes 
appear to offer higher growth without any cost in credibility. In the same way, Husain et al. 
(2005), using the de facto classification from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), find that for 
developing countries with little exposure to international capital markets, pegs are notable for 
their durability and relatively low inflation. Similarly, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) analyse 
the impact of the exchange rate regime on inflation and output in South Eastern and Central 
Europe for the period 1994-2004. Their results reveal a significant impact of fixed exchange 
rates on low inflation. Also, Coudert and Dubert (2005) analyse interesting aspects of the de 
facto regimes followed by major Asian countries over the period 1990-2001. Their results show 
that fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with better performances in terms of inflation. 
While Garofalo (2005), using his de facto classification, examines the influence of different 
                                               
8
 One advantage of fixing the exchange rate in terms of a particular major currency like the dollar is the provision of 
a nominal anchor to prevent inflationary monetary policies. This means that over time domestic price and inflation 
levels will converge with the foreign country. In many developing countries, fixed exchange rates have provided a 
nominal anchor for so long because domestic anchors cannot be achieved due to a lack of institutional 
development, experience and stability. They rely on the fixed exchange rate for its clarity and understanding as well 
as viewing it as a sign of commitment from policymakers. 
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exchange rate policies on the Italy’s economic performance for the period 1861-1998. His 
result shows that inflation performance is apparently better under the gold standard (pegged) 
than in other regimes. 
In the same way, Bleaney and Francisco (2007) examine the relationship between 
exchange rate, inflation and growth in 91 developing countries over the period 1984-2001. 
They distinguish between three exchange rate regime categories: floats, easily adjustable peg 
(soft peg) and those where adjustment is harder (hard pegs, defined by use of a shared 
currency or a currency board system). Their results suggest that floats have growth rates 
similar to soft pegs and only slightly higher inflation; while hard pegs have lower inflation and 
slower growth than other regimes. Similarly, Klein and Shambaugh (2010), using the 
classification scheme from Klein and Shambaugh (2008), study the links between the 
exchange rate regimen and inflation performance based on a data set representing the 
experience of 80 countries (22 industrial, and 58 nonindustrial) over the period 1980-1999. 
They find evidence that a peg affects inflation through both a disciplinary role and credibility 
role. Authors also find that the peg affects average inflation rates over this entire period by 
disciplining monetary policy of nonindustrial countries, but it does not have a similarly 
significant role for industrial economies. On the contrary, Rose (2011) using the data span of 
178 economies from 1974 through 2007 and four methodologies to exchange classification 
(the official IMF; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004 and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenergger, 2005), evaluate the effect of exchange regime on inflation. His results indicate 
that there is no clear relationship between inflation and the exchange rate regime that spans 
all countries. 
Ghanem (2012) empirically assessed the relationship between exchange rate regimes 
and inflation performance for 17 MENA countries over the period 1980-2007. Using the de jure 
IMF and the de facto regimes of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) and controlling for macroeconomic variables that are conventionally 
associated with inflation, the author find that a de jure fixed exchange regime alone does not 
contribute to a lower inflation rate, while credible pegs were associated with lower inflation. 
Author identifies credible regimes by matching what is announced and what is observed. Also, 
when author considering de facto peg regimes, he found that they were strongly associated 
with lower inflation. Moreover, Toulaboe and Terry (2013) investigate the link between 
exchange rate regimes and inflation performance in developing countries, using pooled annual 
data for the period 1985-2006. Based on the de facto classification obtained by using different 
methodologies to assess the volatility of the observed nominal effective exchange rates, their 
results suggest that flexible exchange rate regimes are more inflationary than pegged 
exchange rate regimes. Also, Mohantya and Bhanumurthyb (2014) examine the impact of the 
de facto stable exchange rate regime on inflation in India during 1994-2011. The authors divide 
the sample in different sub-periods of exchange rate stability. The results show that the impact 
of exchange rate regime on inflation is not visible in the Indian case which could be because of 
the offsetting sterilization policy undertaken by the Indian’s central bank during expansionary 
money supply growth resulting from its large-scale intervention to even out exchange rate 
volatility. Similarly, Lohi (2014), using the IMF de facto classification9 and a sample of 36 Sub-
Saharan Africa countries over 1980-2007, study whether the fixed exchange rate regime 
provides lower inflation. His empirical results show that countries with fixed exchange rate 
exhibit lower inflation, but support the inflation-growth trade off. In the same way, Sosvilla-
                                               
9
 Critics constantly moved away from the official International Monetary Fund classification to construct a de facto 
classification system in 1999. The new IMF classification combines the available information on exchange rates and 
monetary policy frameworks, and the formal or informal policy intentions of authorities, with data on actual exchange 
rates and reserve movements to reach an assessment of the actual exchange rate regime (Habermeier et al., 2009, 
provide information on revisions to this classification system in early 2009). However, it can be argued that the new 
IMF classification system is still one of the de jure regimes, since it still relies heavily on official information and looks 
mainly at the behaviour of official exchange rates (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
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Rivero and Ramos-Herrera (2014) analyse the relation between exchange-rate regimes and 
inflation performance in 123 economies, both developed and developing countries, for the 
period 1970-2010. The authors use the de facto classification from Ilzetski et al. (2010). Their 
results suggest that those countries with flexible exchange-rate regimes are characterized by 
higher inflation rates, while the smaller inflation rates are associated with fixed exchange rates 
and countries with intermediate regimes occupy an intermediate position in their records of 
inflation rates. On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2014), based on a novel data set of IMF de 
jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; 
Shambaugh, 2004 and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 2005), for 146 emerging and 
developing economies over 1980–2010, finds that inflation is indeed lower, especially in 
emerging markets, by some four percentage points when the central bank both de jure 
commits and de facto pegs the exchange rate than when it de facto pegs alone. 
3 Empirical Methodology 
A panel data model is used to estimate the impact of exchange rate regimes on the 
inflation. The model used is a static panel data through Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV). The following equation describes the general specification used: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝐷𝑖𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           (1) 
where i =1,2.....N,  t = 1,2....T, yit is the dependent variable in country i and time t,  Xit  is the 
vector of inputs for the i th variables in the t th period,  Di  is a dummy variable,  αi is a country 
specific effect and εit is an error term. We also assume εit ~ (0, σ
2).  
The country specific effect, αi, is designed to capture the determinants of a country's 
inflation rate that are not already controlled by the other explanatory variables. It thus accounts 
for unobservable characteristics that vary across countries but not over time. The country 
specific effect could be either a fixed effect (i.e., a constant that varies for each cross-sectional 
unit), or a random effect (i.e., a random variable drawn from a common distribution with a 
mean α and a variance σ2). We use a Hausman test to decide whether it is more appropriate 
to model the country effects as being fixed or random10. 
We employ a panel data estimating method to determine the impact of the exchange 
arrangement on inflation. The dependent variable is inflation scaled, which is a measure robust 
to hyperinflationary outlier countries. To ascertain that our results are robust to the regime 
classifications, we employ both de jure and de facto classifications in this article. We also use 
three different de facto classifications. 
4 The Data 
The sample consists of panel data for 125 countries classified by the World Bank 
according to their income. Advanced countries are those economies classified as upper 
income countries. Emerging markets countries are defined according to the Morgan Stanley 
                                               
10 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test in this context states that there is no correlation between country effects 
and explanatory variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that modelling country effects as fixed is more 
appropriate. 
8 of 16 
Capital International (MSCI) index11 at that moment. The rest of the countries are designated 
as developing. Table 2 provides a list of countries classified in each group. 
The data set is annual, spanning from 1974 through to 1999. Data availability differs 
across countries. Particularly, the data for East-European countries which starts from the 
1990s. As a consequence, our panel data set is unbalanced. 
 
Table 2: List of Countries 
Advanced 
Countries 
Emerging  
Markets 
Developing  
Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Czech Republic 
Egypt 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Rusia 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameron 
Chad 
Congo, Rep. of 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Gabon 
Gambia, the 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kazahstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao Dem. Rep. 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger  
Nigeria 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Slovak Rep. 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
St. Kitt & Nevis 
St. Vicent & Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Note: Emerging market economies are those that are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
index. Advanced economies are those that are classified as upper income economies by the World Bank, with the 
exception of Israel, which is in an emerging market. The remaining countries were designated as developing 
countries. 
Most of the macroeconomic and financial variables used in our analysis are taken from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's World Economic Outlook 
databases. A few series are taken from the CD-ROM version of the International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistic (IFS). The data from the de jure IMF classification can 
be obtained from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions and Ghosh et al. (2002). The central bank turnover rate, which is the number of 
central bank governors per five-year period, used as a proxy of aversion to inflation, is taken 
from Ghosh et al. (2002) and the Cukierman-Webb central bank database.  
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 The MSCI index classifies a country into an emerging market in line with a number of factors relating to 
international capital market access. 
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Table 3: List of variables used in the estimations 
Variable Description 
Gov. Balance 
Money 
Real GDP 
Openness 
CB turnover 
TT growth 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Central government balance (% of GDP) 
Broad money growth (% per year) 
Real GDP growth (%) 
Exports plus imports of goods and services (% GDP) 
Central Bank turnover rate (per 5 years) 
Terms of trade growth (%) 
Dummy variable capturing float exchange rate regimes 
Dummy variable capturing intermediate arrangements 
 
Notes: The table does not include the dependent variables, which are explained in the text. Variables expressed in 
US dollars were converted to the natural logarithmic scale for the purpose of estimation. 
 
The variables used in this analysis and their descriptions are listed in Table 3. These 
variables were selected on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical literature. 
Government balance is defined as current and capital revenue and official grants received, 
less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. This variable considers central 
governments only. Money and quasi money are defined as the sum of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. This definition 
of money supply is frequently called M2. Variables expressed in US dollar were converted to 
the natural logarithmic scale. The rest of variables were expressed in percentage. Finally, 
floating and intermediate exchange rate regimes are identified with a dummy variable that 
received the value of one in which these regimes prevail in a country in a particular year.  
5 Estimation Results 
This section presents the results of regressions for the Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV). The LSDV estimated models are an unbalanced panel with robust standard errors. In 
the estimating of inflation, following Ghosh et al. (1997), we transform the inflation rate by 
calculating a scaled measure, 
𝜋
𝜋+1
 , to avoid the bias caused by some cases of very high 
inflation without deleting them from the sample. 
To examine the relationship between exchange rate arrangements and inflation we 
regress the scaled inflation (henceforth inflation) on two exchange rate system dummies for 
floating and intermediate rate regimes. The dummy takes the value one if a floating or 
intermediate exchange rate regime prevails in a country in a particular year; otherwise, it is 
assigned a value of zero. Fixed exchange rate regimes are the excluded category. Hence, the 
coefficients on floating and intermediate regimes should be interpreted as the inflation 
differential relative to a fixed exchange rate arrangement. The independent variables are broad 
money growth, real per capita GDP growth, trade openness, central bank governor turnover 
rate, terms of trade growth and government balance. Faster money growth is associated with 
high inflation (by raising money supply), while higher real GDP growth should reduce inflation 
(by increasing money demand). Similarly, we expect a negative sign in the trade openness 
coefficient because greater trade openness increases the cost of a monetary expansion, which 
should imply lower inflation in more open economies12. 
                                               
12
 If a country opens up to trade, the incentive to inflate diminishes because if the price index that monetary 
authorities seek to stabilise includes foreign goods, real currency depreciation exacerbates the inflation cost of a 
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The central bank governor turnover rate is a proxy for central bank independence13. A 
higher turnover rate of the central bank governor should be associated with higher inflation. 
Also, we include terms of trade growth because it contributes to aggregate demand pressures. 
The government balance (fiscal balance) is closely related to inflation. If the government 
balance is negative (fiscal deficit), the need to finance this fiscal deficit can lead to an 
excessive growth in money supply, which causes inflation. 
As shown by Table 4, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test (no correlation between the 
country effects and the explanatory variables) is rejected at a 5% level in most cases and at a 
10% level in emerging countries with the LYS de facto classification. As a consequence, we 
use the fixed effects model except in emerging countries with the HMR de facto schemes, 
because the Hausman specification test suggests that it is more appropriate to model the 
country effects as random rather than fixed in this case.  
 
Table 4: Hausman Specification Test 
Classification All Countries Advanced Emerging Developing 
Natural          χ2 (8) = 64.5(0.00) χ2 (8) = 83.8(0.00) χ2 (8) = 14.4(0.03) χ2 (8) = 66.4(0.00) 
LYS      χ2 (8) = 71.4(0.00)  χ2 (8) = 185.3(0.00) χ2 (8) = 15.5(0.05) χ2 (8) = 145.1(0.00) 
HMR            χ2 (8) = 44.7(0.00)  χ2 (8) = 61.2(0.00) χ2 (8) = 11.3(0.19) χ2 (8) = 42.9(0.00) 
De Jure          χ2 (8) = 29.4(0.00)  χ2 (8) = 210.9(0.00)  χ2 (8) = 17.5(0.03)  χ2 (8) = 102.2(0.00) 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report the impact of exchange arrangements on inflation in all and 
advanced economies, and in emerging and developing countries, respectively. As indicated by 
the adjusted R2, the model explains between 75 and 87 per cent of the variation in inflation 
rates in our sample.  
The sign of the coefficients on the explanatory variables are generally statistically 
significant and consistent with theory. Money growth shows a positive sign in all estimations 
(not always statistically significant). While real GDP growth shows a negative sign, as 
expected. Similarly, the openness variable shows a negative sign, so that a more open 
economy has less inflation14. The central bank turnover rate shows a positive association with 
inflation in almost all samples. However, when we estimate the inflation equation in advanced 
economies this variable shows a negative and statistically significant relation with inflation 
(except in the LYS scheme but it is statistically insignificant). This negative relation may 
capture the fact that these countries are more developed institutionally. Conversely, the central 
bank turnover rate shows a positive association with inflation in emerging and developing 
countries. Terms of trade growth show a negative sign in all, advanced and developing 
countries, but it shows a positive sign in emerging economies (not statistically significant). 
Finally, the government balance (fiscal balance) displays a negative sign in most of cases, but 
usually this variable is not statistically significant. In general, these results suggest that higher 
real GDP growth and trade openness reduces inflation, while faster money growth and central 
bank governor turnover rates increase inflation, as expected. 
                                                                                                                                                  
monetary expansion. Romer (1993) tests the proposition that more open economies have lower inflation rates. He 
finds that more open countries indeed appear to have lower inflation, and generally finds this conclusion to be quite 
robust. 
13
 According to the literature on policy credibility, an independent central bank can help solve the time-inconsistency 
problem. Hence, if central banks are less independent, governors can be fired more easily (Cukierman et al., 1992). 
14
 These results are interesting because openness is a traditional variable of the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) 
theory. An increase in trade openness makes a country more likely to adopt a fixed regime as opposed to an 
intermediate or floating regime. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflation in  
All Countries and Advanced Economies 
 All Countries Advanced Economies 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant 0.18 
(8.75)* 
0.15 
(7.92)* 
0.17 
(12.92)* 
0.19 
(9.62)* 
0.15 
(7.61)* 
0.14 
(8.01)* 
0.15 
(7.65)* 
0.15 
(7.97)* 
Money 7.14e-05 
(1.16) 
7.07e-05 
(1.40) 
0.04 
(4.76)# 
7.78e-05 
(1.32) 
0.14 
(3.16)* 
0.06 
(2.26)# 
0.14 
(3.06)* 
0.13 
(3.18)* 
Real GDP -0.51 
(-4.03)* 
-0.35 
(-3.61)* 
-0.41 
(-3.01)* 
-0.52 
(-3.75)* 
-0.13 
(-1.30) 
-0.15 
(-1.65)^ 
-0.22 
(-1.91)# 
-0.14 
(-1.53) 
Openness -0.13 
(-6.69)* 
-0.10 
(-5.00)* 
-0.12 
(-7.39)* 
-0.12 
(-6.27)* 
-0.18 
(-7.40)* 
-0.17 
(-7.39)* 
-0.19 
(-7.34)* 
-0.18 
(-7.59)* 
CB turnover 0.10 
(7.23)* 
0.12 
(7.12)* 
0.02 
(1.30) 
0.10 
(6.69)* 
-0.51 
(-4.27)* 
0.02 
(1.07) 
-0.06 
(-4.13)* 
-0.05 
(-3.74)* 
TT growth -0.002 
(-0.13) 
0.02 
(0.76) 
-0.04 
(-1.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
-0.11 
(-2.75)* 
-0.08 
(-2.08)# 
-0.10 
(-2.72)* 
-0.11 
(-2.52)# 
Gov. balance -0.04 
(-0.44) 
-0.10 
(-1.12) 
-0.06 
(-0.80) 
-0.13 
(-1.55) 
-0.04 
(-0.87) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.04 
(-0.78) 
-0.04 
(-0.86) 
Floating 0.10 
(9.62)* 
0.04 
(5.90)* 
0.04 
(2.58)* 
0.02 
(1.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
-0.01 
(-2.33)# 
Intermediate 0.004 
(0.50) 
0.09 
(7.56)* 
0.02 
(2.86)# 
0.03 
(2.35)# 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.014 
(1.91)^ 
0.01 
(2.31)# 
0.02 
(4.08)* 
Observations 1806 1442 1147 1778 562 445 486 582 
F-test prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.82 0.82 
 
Notes: The table reports the least squares dummy variables results of unbalanced panels with fixed effects. 
Dependent variable is inflation. The standard errors of the estimates are robust to cross contemporaneous 
correlation.  t -statistics are displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance at the 1 per cent level, (#) at the 5 per cent 
and (^) at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
Table 6: The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflation in  
Emerging and Developing Countries 
 Emerging Economies Developing Countries 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant 0.16 
(7.18)* 
0.11 
(5.20)* 
0.20 
(4.88)* 
0.18 
(7.39)* 
0.23 
(5.556)* 
0.18 
(4.72)* 
0.06 
(2.89)* 
0.22 
(6.87)* 
Money 4.22e-05 
(1.16) 
3.93e-05 
(1.02) 
0.03 
(5.14)* 
4.75e-05 
(1.07) 
0.02 
(2.85)* 
0.01 
(4.17)* 
0.27 
(7.98)* 
0.02 
(3.33)* 
Real GDP -0.47 
(-3.06)* 
-0.39 
(-2.45)# 
-0.64 
(-3.10)* 
-0.51 
(-2.37)# 
-0.54 
(-3.23)* 
-0.27 
(-2.02)# 
-0.38 
(-2.45)# 
-0.57 
(-3.46)* 
Openness -0.11 
(-3.63)* 
-0.05 
(-1.96)^ 
-0.13 
(-4.19)* 
-0.11 
(-4.72)* 
-0.10 
(-4.09)* 
-0.09 
(-3.05)* 
0.04 
(1.07) 
-0.09 
(-4.15)* 
CB turnover 0.14 
(4.55)* 
0.17 
(6.156)* 
0.08 
(3.71)* 
0.18 
(5.53)* 
0.08 
(3.95)* 
0.10 
(4.11)* 
0.03 
(1.83)^ 
0.09 
(4.37)* 
TT growth 0.05 
(1.27) 
0.05 
(1.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.58) 
0.03 
(0.71) 
-0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
-0.08 
(-2.89)* 
-0.02 
(-1.07) 
Gov. balance 0.12 
(-0.88) 
-0.20 
(-1.09) 
-0.03 
(-0.14) 
-0.37 
(-2.51)# 
0.12 
(1.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.64) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
Floating 0.17 
(8.32)* 
0.03 
(2.08)3 
0.13 
(4.19)* 
0.04 
(0.99) 
0.08 
(4.16)* 
0.04 
(3.12)* 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(2.60)* 
Intermediate 0.02 
(1.08) 
0.12 
(5.66)* 
0.04 
(2.18)# 
0.04 
(2.02)# 
-0.04 
(-1.63) 
0.081 
(4.64)* 
0.01 
(1.03) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
Observations 513 408 357 489 731 589 304 727 
F-test prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R2 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.78 
 
Notes: The table reports the least squares dummy variables results of unbalanced panels with fixed effects. 
Dependent variable is inflation. The standard errors of the estimates are robust to cross contemporaneous 
correlation. t -statistics are displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance at the 1 per cent level, (#) at the 5 per cent 
and (^) at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
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On the other hand, when the impact on inflation of our main variable of interest is 
analysed it is found that there are positive and significant associations between inflation and 
floating and intermediate exchange regimes in most classifications. In other words, fixed 
exchange regimes are associated with lower inflation rates, in contrast to floating and 
intermediate regimes. Particularly, in emerging and developing countries the de facto floating 
regimes, from natural classification, show an inflation rate of 16.5% and 8.2% bigger than 
under fixed regimes, respectively. Interestingly, in contrast to the results for the world, 
emerging and developing samples, fixed regimes are associated with higher inflation in 
advanced economies when we use the de jure classification15. De jure floating in advanced 
economies is associated with inflation rates that are 1.4% lower than under fixed regimes, 
while intermediate regimes are associated with higher inflation relative to fixed regimes (about 
2.3%). 
In addition, our results on intermediate regimes show that the inflation rate is higher in 
advanced countries using intermediate regimes compared to those advanced economies 
using fixed and floating regimes. Conversely, the effects of intermediate regimes on inflation 
are weaker than the effects of floating regimes in emerging countries. In developing countries, 
intermediate arrangements display a lower impact on inflation than fixed and floating regimes 
but the coefficient is not significant. In Table 7 the performance of exchange rate regimes on 
inflation is reported. In most cases, inflation is lower if the regime is fixed. This finding is in line 
with De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005), Coudert and Dubert (2005), Bleaney and Francisco 
(2007) and Sosvilla-Rivero and Ramos-Herrera (2014), among others. 
 
Table 7: Exchange Arrangements Performance on Inflation 
 Natural LYS HMR De Jure 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking from the best 
to the worst 
performance 
All Countries 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Advanced Economies 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Emerging Economies 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Developing Countries 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
 
Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Comparing our results for developing countries to earlier studies by Ghosh et al. (1997, 
2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) and Husain et al. (2005), we notice that they are 
largely similar. Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002) find that, in the relatively low income per capita 
developing countries (based on the World Bank classification), inflation under a fixed 
                                               
15
 Similarly, the natural classification shows a positive association between fixed regimes and inflation in advanced 
economies, but its coefficient is too low and not significant. 
13 of 16 
exchange arrangement is significantly lower than under intermediate or floating exchange rate 
regimes in the period 1970-1999. Similarly, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) find that 
fixed exchange rates are associated with lower inflation than floating or intermediate exchange 
rates in non-industrial countries (both emerging markets and developing countries), but, in 
contrast with Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002), floating arrangements are associated with lower 
inflation than intermediate ones (see Table 8). The results obtained by Husain et al. (2005) 
suggest that developing countries appear to benefit from fixed exchange rates because they 
deliver a lower inflation than floating or intermediate regimes. When we use the de jure 
classification, our results are similar to Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002) and Husain et al. (2005), 
while our results using the LYS and HMR classifications are similar to Levy-Yeyati y 
Sturzenegger (2001)16.  
 
Table 8: Inflation and Exchange Arrangements in Developing Countries 
  
Gosh et al. 
(2002) 
Levy-Yeyati 
& 
Sturzenegger 
(2001) 
 
Hussain et 
al. (2005) 
 
Our results 
    Natural LYS HMR De Jure 
Period 1970-1999 1974-1999  1970-1999  1974-1999  1974-1999  1974-1999  1974-1999 
Observations 967 629  1401 731 589 304 727 
Method Pool Pool Pool LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV 
Ranking Fixed Fixed Fixed Intermediate* Fixed Fixed Fixed 
 Intermediate Floating Intermediate* Fixed Floating Floating* Intermediate* 
 Floating Intermediate Floating Floating Intermediate Intermediate* Floating 
Note: The results by Husain et al. (2005) are based on their estimate with country fixed effects. (*) insignificant 
variables. 
Source: Gosh et. al (2002), Levy-yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001), Husain et al. (2005) and Author's calculations. 
 
In summary, our results provide some support for the role of fixed exchange rate regimes 
as credibility enhancing stabilisation devices particularly in emerging and developing 
economies. The inflation results are quite robust to different exchange rate classifications. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The academic debate on the most appropriate exchange rate regime for a country or 
group of countries has been one of the most controversial topics in theoretical and empirical 
literature. Notwithstanding its increasing relevance to policy, the literature offers relatively few 
empirical studies about the impact of the exchange rate regime on inflation performance in 
developed, emerging and developing countries, separately. This article has provided an 
empirical analysis of the impact of different exchange rate regimes on inflation in advanced, 
emerging and developing countries. To this end, we have attempted to make two contributions. 
Firstly, we distinguish between the de jure and the three de facto classifications system. We 
have used the IMF de jure classification and checked the robustness of our results with three 
different de facto classifications: the LYS classification based on a clustered analysis, the 
natural classification based mainly on market determined dual and parallel exchange rates, 
and the HMR classification based on exchange rate regimes and taking into account external 
shocks and revaluations.  
                                               
16
 Our model was also applied to non-industrial countries (both emerging and developing) and the results are similar 
to those of developing countries. These results are available upon request. 
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Secondly, we have used a least squares dummy variables regression technique to study 
whether a particular exchange rate regime affects inflation performance. Our empirical findings 
indicate clear support for fixed regimes. It provides support for the role of fixed exchange rate 
regimes as a credible nominal anchor for the evolution of price levels, particularly in emerging 
and developing countries. Emerging and developing countries with a lower budget deficit, 
higher central bank independence, higher ratio of exports plus imports to GDP and fixed 
regimes show better inflation performances than others. Conversely, fixed regimes are 
associated with more inflation in advanced economies when we use the de jure classification 
only. Fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with lower inflation rates particularly in 
emerging and developing countries. Developing countries using de jure floating exchange rate 
regimes show an inflation rate of 2.9% bigger than developing countries using de jure fixed 
regimes. 
In light of these results, it can be concluded that a fixed exchange rate arrangement is 
superior to another exchange rate regime in delivering better inflation performance particularly 
in developing countries. The credibility associated with fixed exchange rates may play an 
important role in promoting financial stability since this regime can discipline policy-making and 
minimises discretion. An important part of literature considers adopting a foreign currency 
(dollarization) as the domestic currency to buy a credible policy of price stability, eliminate the 
role of short-run discretionary government policies that can give rise to policy inconsistencies.  
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